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ABSTRACT 
We use a new community banking data set constructed by Federal Deposits Insurance Corporation 
to examine loan loss provisioning in U.S. community banks. We find that community banks use 
loan loss provisions to smooth their income. In addition, we find community banks employ a 
dynamic income smoothing process using loan charge-offs to keep allowance account flat 
overtime. Our evidence shows that loan loss provision is responsive to variations in local economic 
conditions. We do not find evidence that loan loss provisioning differs between standalone 
community banks and the community banks that are part of bank holding companies. Specifically, 
we do not find evidence that community banks that are part of bank holding companies are less 
aggressive in income smoothing than standalone community banks. However, our study provides 
evidence that traded community banks do not indulge in income smoothing. One possible 
explanation could be the stricter scrutiny from regulators, investors and analysts. Our study 
complements to the bank income smoothing literature by investigating the income smoothing of 
community banks. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Loan loss provision reflects bank managers’ estimation of possible future loss of loan portfolios 
due to unrecovered loans. It is the most important and the largest accrual for banks (Kanagaretnam 
et al., 2010). As loan loss provisions are directly charged against income statement before 
estimating net income, and managers have discretion in determining timing and amount for this 
account; as such loan loss provisions are closely related to transparency and timely accounting 
information in banks. However, literature overwhelmingly finds the loan loss provision is used as 
a major tool for banks to manipulate their earnings (Greenwalt and Sinkey, 1988; Wahlen, 1994; 
Collins et al., 1995; Beatty et al., 1995; Ahmed et al., 1999; Liu and Ryan, 1995, 2006; Laeven 
and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Kanagaretnam et al., 2003; Fonseca and 
Gonzalez, 2008; Ryan and Keely, 2013).  
Income smoothing literature to date has examined loan loss provisioning for large 
commercial banks and bank holding companies. For instance, Kim and Kross (1998), 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2010), Liu and Ryan (2006), Beck and Narayanamoorthy (2013) investigate 
into bank holding companies; Bushman and Williams (2012) examine both private and public 
banks with assets in excess of 5 billion dollars. Community banks, which are on average smaller 
in size and are not usually publicly traded, practically remain thinly covered in the existing 
literature. It might be that the researchers have tough time finding a practical way of defining 
community banks. There is no study to our knowledge that investigates the income smoothing 
behavior of community banks. Prior studies on community banks often use a 1 billion size cut-off 
for defining community banks (DeYoung et al., 2004). However, size is not a good proxy since it 
is just loosely related to community banks. Not to mention a fixed size cut-off does not consider 
the inflation and the growth of banking industry. Logically, factors such as primary engagement 
in traditional banking business and operations spanning limited geographic region merit 
consideration in identifying community banks. Accordingly, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) community banking study 1  (2012) uses a multidimensional approach to 
defining community banks, given their access to rich sources of data on community banks. FDIC 
study defines community banks by imposing geographic limits, business type limits, and multiple 
                                                             
1 See FDIC community banking study at https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/cbi/study.html 
 2 
size limits. These limits allow inclusion of large community banks, which have been excluded in 
previous studies that uses community bank sample. More importantly, by definition FDIC sample 
of community banks includes banks which are expected to be more responsive to shocks to local 
economy. The newly constructed FDIC sample of community banks accounts for 94 percent of all 
bank organizations and the majority of deposits of these banks come from non-metropolitan area.  
In this study, we use the new definition proposed by FDIC and try to gain understanding 
of earning management behavior of community banks. To our knowledge, this is the first study 
that uses this definition to construct the sample to examine income-smoothing behavior of 
community banks. Income smoothing can be quite different and may serve a very different purpose 
in community banks compared to large commercial banks. First, the motivations behind income 
smoothing can be different at community banks. As opposed to commercial banks, most of 
community banks are not publicly traded. As a result, in contrast to commercial banks, community 
banks do not need to be concerned about meeting analysts’ forecasts. Second, according to FDIC 
community banking study (2012), compared to non-community banks, community banks less 
frequently raise external financing to operate their business. As a general practice, the retained 
earnings support their business, exceptions can be significant expansion in their business or 
significant financial loss. Therefore, community banks might have less incentive to lower their 
cost of capital through income smoothing. Third, because community banks are locally operated, 
the loan loss provisions of such banks are sensitive to the variation in local economy. On the 
contrary, large commercial banks may have operation across states, nationwide, or even globally, 
thus enjoy significant geographic diversification in loan portfolio. Therefore, the loan loss 
provisions for commercial banks are less sensitive to local economic conditions. Fourth, Liu and 
Ryan (2006) point out that banks accelerate the loan loss provisions of homogenous loans 
(consumer loans) during boom and delay loan loss provisions of heterogenous loans (commercial 
loans) during recession. Community banks mainly engage in traditional banking, consequently, 
they have fewer commercial loans and more consumer loans compared to those of commercial 
banks. This can be another reason that community banks would behave differently in loan loss 
provisioning than commercial banks. This study complements the studies which examine the 
smoothing behavior of bank holding companies and traded banks. Because community banks play 
pivotal role in the development and growth of small businesses and non-metropolitan economies, 
they are unique and essential to U.S. economy. Therefore, our study has implications for regulators 
in designing and implementing policies affecting community banks.  
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We attempt to address four questions. First, since motivations can be different in 
community banks, we investigate whether income smoothing through loan loss provisioning exists 
in community banks. Second, different from previous researches using macroeconomic variables 
in loan loss provisioning models for commercial banks, we examine whether local economic 
information affects the loan loss provisioning in community banks. Third, since the new definition 
includes large bank holding companies as community banks, we want to know whether there is a 
difference in loan loss provisioning between community banks that are part of bank holding 
companies and community banks that are not. Fourth, dynamic income smoothing is proposed by 
Liu and Ryan (2006) as a way for banks to obscure their income-smoothing behavior and keeping 
a smooth loan loss allowance. We examine whether dynamic income smoothing also exists in 
community banks.  
This study proceeds as follows. Section 1 documents the prior related literature; Section 2 
and 3 represents our hypothesis and data; Section 4 describes methodology used in this study; 
Section 5 reports the empirical results; and Section 6 concludes. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Loan Loss Provisioning and Income Smoothing 
Literature puts forward many reasons for banks to manipulate loan loss provisioning. Three main 
reasons that dominate the literature are a)  to reduce the volatility of income, and as a result, banks 
can lower their cost of capital (Greenwald and Sinkey, 1988; Wahlen, 1994; Laeven and Majnoni, 
2003); b)  capital management (Kim and Kross, 1998; Ahamed et al., 1999; Laeven and Majnoni, 
2003) and c)  signaling financial strength in the future (Wahlen, 1994; Beaver and Engel, 1996). 
Other reasons include meeting analysts’ forecasts (Galai et al., 2003); managerial incentives 
(Lambert, 1984; Joyce, 1996); and tax incentives (Rozycki, 1997). 
With respect to the signaling theory, Wahlen (1994) report bank managers increase 
discretionary part of loan loss provisions when they expect stronger cash flows in the future. 
Because loan loss provisions reduce income, the managers are able to adjust their income based 
on their expectations. Apart from this, the study finds investors take an increase in discretionary 
loan loss provisions positively, because they believe banks convey private information through 
this behavior. Consistent with Wahlen (1994), Beaver and Engel (1996) examine how capital 
market react to discretionary and nondiscretionary loan loss provisions and report that investors 
view an increase in discretionary loan loss provisions positively and an increase in non-
discretionary loan loss provisions negatively during 1985 to 1991. Ahamed et al. (1999), however, 
test the signaling theory using a different specification. Instead of running one-year ahead change 
in earnings on discretionary loan loss provisions, they regress loan loss provisions on one-year 
ahead change in earnings. Contrary to the findings of Wahlen (1994), Ahamed et al. (1999) find 
that one-year ahead change in earnings is significantly negatively associated with loan loss 
provisions. They suggest that studying different time-period might be the reason that they have a 
contrary result, since they rerun the regressions from Wahlen (1994) and find the same negative 
relationship between one-year ahead change in earnings and loan loss provisions during their study 
period. 
Earning management literature is extensive. Collins et al. (1995) use bank-specific method 
and observe that loan loss provision is significantly positively associated with operating earnings 
before security gains and losses and other items.  Ahmed et al. (1999) apply the loan loss 
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provisioning model from Collins et al. (1995) and find that income-smoothing behavior exists in 
banks in the new capital regime when loan loss reserves do not qualify for tier 1 capital.  Laeven 
and Majnoni (2003) in a multi-country sample of banks, find strong evidence of income smoothing 
in banks from four regions USA, Europe, Japan, Latin America, while they do not find evidence 
of income smoothing in Asian banks. Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) develop a loan loss 
provisioning model based on the works by Laeven and Majnoni (2003) and Cavallo and Majnoni 
(2002). Using a multi-country sample, Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) regress loan loss 
provisions on a lagged dependent variable and other determinants. They find a consistent income 
smoothing result. Liu and Ryan (2006) find profitable banks tend to be more aggressive in income 
smoothing during boom. One of the contributions of Liu and Ryan (2006) is that they assert loan 
charge-offs are discretionary and propose a dynamic income smoothing model. In an international 
sample of banks, Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008) add country effects and capital ratio to 
specifications used in Laeven and Majnoni (2003), additionally, they also use the level of loan loss 
reserves as a control variable and find significant evidence of income-smoothing behavior in 
banks. Similarly, in a cross-country sample of banks from 27 countries, Bushman and Williams 
(2012) also report that managers may use discretionary loan loss provisioning for income 
smoothing and dampen disciplinary risk-taking behavior of banks. 
However, a small number of studies report no evidence of income smoothing. For example, 
Beatty et al. (1995) argue that capital management and earning management are jointly determined 
and report no evidence of income smoothing. Ahmed et al. (1999) do not find evidence of income 
smoothing until they adopt Collins et al. (1995) model. The primary reason for no evidence of 
income smoothing in these studies is that they focused on pre-BASEL period, for which the loan 
loss provisions are subtracted from income but added back to capital. Therefore, using sample 
from this period, it is difficult to separate earning management from capital management.  
2.2 Bank Performance and Local Economic Conditions 
Literature Finds mixed results on the relationship of bank performance and economic 
conditions. Meyer and Yeager (2001) examine whether local economic downturns affect small 
rural banks. By studying small banks under 300 million dollars in rural area, they find bank 
performance, measured by variables such as adjusted return on assets (ROA) and nonperforming 
loans to total loans, is significantly related to local economic conditions at state level, while not at 
county level. In contrast to the literature that uses single economic indicator such as Gross State 
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Product (GSP), Daly et al. (2003) use a composite index by Crone (2002) and find the state-level 
composite economic index robustly explains the bank performance measured by nonperforming 
loans. However, Yeager (2004) compare community banks which suffered through economic 
downturns with those which did not suffer economic shocks, and he conclude that economic 
shocks are not the contributor to the decline of community banks. Furlong and Krainer (2007) 
provide a new perspective in the relationship between local economic condition and bank 
performance by suggesting not only studying the average effect of local economic condition on 
bank performance, but also on the distribution of bank performance. Using small banks under one 
billion dollars and state-level economic data, they conclude that community banks could act very 
positive or very negative to the same state-level economic shock, and the reason for this significant 
variation is the different natures of the shocks and different loan portfolios of banks.  
2.3 Loan Loss Provisioning Models 
The minimum capital requirement under BASEL has raised concern regarding the 
procyclical effect to economy. Literature points out that during economic downturns, banks tend 
to provide less capital to the markets in order to reach the minimum capital requirement. This 
undesired effect of BASEL is expected to accelerate the deterioration of the economy during the 
downturns (Alistair and Elizabeth, 2001). The research of Laeven and Majnoni (2003) provides 
more insight into pro-cyclical effect of BASEL I. In a sample drawn from 45 counties around the 
world covering the period from 1988 to 1999, which includes at least one business cycle, Laeven 
and Majnoni (2003) use a bank-specific random effect model to test this question. In the model, 
the loan growth is used to control the bank-specific risk and the change in Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) is used to control economic cycle. In addition, year dummies are also account for unknown 
time effects such as the changes in regulation. The study shows that loan loss provisions are 
significantly negatively associated with the loan growth, which is not desirable since loan loss 
provisions should increase with expanding credit. The change in GDP is significantly negatively 
associated with loan loss provisions, which indicates that the loan loss provision decisions are 
concurrent to the changes in the economy, and that the economic conditions are the major factors 
that managers take into account in determining the size of the loan loss provisions. Another 
important finding of Laeven and Majnoni (2003) is that banks with negative earnings tend to make 
larger loan loss provisions than banks with positive earnings, suggesting banks make more loan 
loss provisions at bust and therefore leave less capital available to the market, this behavior of 
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banks deteriorates the procyclical problem. Agénora and Silva (2017) find that dynamic loan loss 
provisioning which uses future information can be an effective solution to the procyclical problem.  
Liu and Ryan (1995) find in economic downturns, banks are able to delay loan loss 
provisions of heterogeneous loans rather than homogeneous loans. However, Liu and Ryan (2006) 
find that in economic upturns, banks behave differently in their treatment of loan loss provisions. 
More specifically, they find banks accelerate the loan loss provisions for homogeneous loans 
instead of heterogeneous loans and use charge-offs and recoveries of homogenous loans to keep 
their loan loss allowance flat during boom. Liu and Ryan are the first to propose that charge-offs 
are discretionary. Liu and Ryan regress a fixed time effect model based on the model by Ahmed 
et al. (1999) and deflate variables by assets at beginning of the year. Compared with the model by 
Ahmed et al. (1999), Liu and Ryan’s model add a dummy takes 1 when a bank has above-median 
ROA, the percentage of homogeneous loans over total loans, and interactions of these two 
variables with earnings. These two interactions are significantly positive, providing evidence that 
banks which are more profitable and have more homogenous loans indulge into income smoothing 
during economic upturns. Liu and Ryan also find a significantly positive coefficient on earnings, 
consistent with the literature that reports significant income smoothing at banks.  
Kanagaretnam et al. (2010) investigate the auditor independence in the banking industry. 
Specifically, they investigate the relationship between unexpected audit fee and abnormal loan loss 
provisions. In a sample of banks covering a period from 2000 to 2006, Kanagaretnam et al. use 
two stage regressions to test this research question. The first stage uses loan loss provisioning 
model to obtain abnormal loan loss provisions, and the second stage estimates the relationship 
between abnormal loan loss provisions and abnormal audit fee. They develop their loan loss 
provisioning model by integrating models from Wahlen (1994) and Kanagaretnam et al. (2004). 
Control variables in the loan loss provisioning model of Kanagaretnam et al. (2010) include year 
beginning value of loan loss allowance, non-performing loans; change in the non-performing loans; 
net loan charge-offs; loan growth; total outstanding loans; loans categories and year controls. 
Besides, they deflate all the variables by asset at beginning of the year. Compared with previous 
models, their model controls for more factors and is more comprehensive.  
It has been argued that using incurred loss model to estimate loan loss provisions has 
potential procyclical effect. For example, using incurred loss information, such as nonperforming 
loans that are recorded when loans default over 90 days, causes a delay in the recognition of loan 
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loss provisions. Bushman and Williams (2012) examine the possible consequences of discretion 
in loan loss provisions and forward-looking loan loss provisioning models in the context of risk-
taking. Their sample consists of both private and public banks from 27 countries from 1995 to 
2006. Including the change in the nonperforming loans at the following year, Bushman and 
Williams test income-smoothing behavior in a forward-looking model. They control for concurrent 
and past two year’s change of nonperforming loans, capital ratio, size, and the change in the GDP, 
and their results show a significant positive loading for earnings, which indicates income-
smoothing behavior, and a significantly positive loading for forward-nonperforming loans, 
suggesting loan loss provisioning is forward-looking. 
Beck and Narayanamoorthy (2013) investigate in effect of Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC)’s new guidance, Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) 102 and the policy statement 
of Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) (2001) on banks informativeness. 
They propose that SAB 102 and FFIEC (2001) policy statement encourage banks to rely more on 
historical charge-offs and less on nonperforming loans in determining the size of loan loss 
provision. And they put forward that these policies improve the informativeness of loan loss 
allowance (the association between loan loss allowance and future charge-offs) in strong banks 
which have better profitability and capital ratios. Beck and Narayanamoorthy regress both loan 
loss allowance and loan loss provisions models. In the loan loss provisioning model, they control 
for change in nonperforming loans, charge-offs, loans categories, size, change in the 
unemployment rate, and the return on the Case-Shiller real estate index. Using bank holding 
companies’ quarterly data from 1992 to 2008, Beck and Narayanamoorthy find effects of the 
policies are as expected.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9 
CHAPTER 3 
HYPOTHESES 
Prior studies focused on relatively larger commercial banks and documented that the coefficients 
on banks’ earnings are significantly positive in different loan loss provisioning models (Collins et 
al., 1995; Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Liu and Ryan, 2006; 
Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2008), suggesting significant evidence of income smoothing. However, to 
our knowledge, income-smoothing behavior of community banks remains unexplored in academic 
literature. Unlike large commercial banks, most of community banks are not publicly traded. 
According to FDIC community banking study (2012), till 2011, around 84% of community banks 
are not publicly traded, among the rest, only 5% of community banks are traded in major exchanges. 
As a result, they may have less incentive to create a stable income to lower their cost of capital, to 
signal future financial strength, and to meet analysts’ forecasts, suggesting little incentive to use 
loan loss provisions for income smoothing. Nevertheless, other motivations for income smoothing, 
such as agency problems, in particular managerial incentives and design of executive 
compensation packages, may still be instrumental in the use of loan loss provisions for income 
smoothing at community banks. Therefore, we propose that use of loan loss provisions for income 
smoothing exists in community banks. If income-smoothing behavior does exist in community 
banks, we should observe significantly positive coefficients on earnings in loan loss provisioning 
models.  
H1: In community banks, the relation between loan loss provisions and contemptuous income is 
significantly positive.  
Prior studies on income-smoothing behavior are not able to compare the standalone 
community banks with community banks that are part of bank holding companies in loan loss 
provisioning, because those studies generally examine large commercial banks or bank holding 
companies. However, in our bank sample, we include community banks that are part of bank 
holding companies and community banks that are standalone. Therefore, we are able to test the 
bank holding company effect by hypothesizing that community banks which are part of bank 
holding companies smooth less income than standalone community banks. We hypothesize it for 
two reasons. Community banks that are part of bank holding companies have better access to 
resources at economic downturns than standalone community banks, because the better performing 
units may prop the poorly performing units during the downturns. Since a bank holding company 
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can own several banks, the business of a bank holding company is expected to be more diversified 
than a standalone community bank. As a result, community banks that are part of bank holding 
companies have less incentive to create an excess reserve for economic downturns. In addition, 
the community banks that are part of the bank holding company are more likely to be traded as 
such they may benefit from capital market scrutiny. In particular, the scrutiny of capital market 
regulatory bodies, such as SEC, the analysts and investors compared to the standalone community 
banks2. As such we hypothesize:  
H2: Community banks that are part of bank holding companies may smooth income less 
aggressively than standalone community banks. 
The relation between local economic conditions and community banks has been examined 
in a variety of studies and the results are mixed to date. For example, Daly et al. (2003) find the 
state-level composite index of economic performance, that includes multiple regional economic 
indicators, is very relevant to the bank performance such as nonperforming loans. However, 
Yeager (2004) conclude that the local economic downturn is not the reason for the demise of 
community banks. Consistent with Daly et al. (2003), we use the state-level composite index 
constructed by Crone (2002) to test the relation between local economic conditions and loan loss 
provisions in community banks.  
Many studies include economic variables in loan loss provisioning models to examine 
noncommunity banks. Bushman and Williams (2012) find the loan loss provisions behave 
differently across countries, therefore they used percentage change in GDP, to control the 
macroeconomic conditions in cross-country data. Nevertheless, they do not find the percentage 
change in GDP loading with a significant coefficient in their loan loss provisioning regression. 
Beck and Narayanamoorthy (2013) adopt change in the unemployment rate and return on Case-
Shiller index as two control variables in their loan loss provisioning model, and they find these 
two variables are significant in loan loss provisioning regressions. Because community banks are 
expected to be more connected with local economic activities, they are expected to be affected 
more by the variations in local economic conditions, as such the economic indicators that better 
reflect the local economic situation are naturally expected to have significant effect on the loan 
                                                             
2 For instance, in late 1990s, SEC investigated into SunTrust bank for holding too much loan loss allowance for the 
purpose of income smoothing and forced the bank to reduce $100 million of its loan loss allowance. Later, SEC 
issued a new guidance SAB 102 for loan loss allowance in 2001. (Sutton 1997; Levitt 1998; Wall and Koch 2000) 
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loss provisioning of community banks. This suggests that state-level economic indicators would 
be strongly loaded in the loan loss provisioning regressions for community banks. If community 
banks account for local economic conditions in estimating loan loss provisions, we expect to 
observe a significantly negative loading for the change of local economic indicators in loan loss 
provisioning regression. 
H3: Local economic conditions are expected to strongly explain the loan loss provisioning of 
community banks.   
Last but not at least, we reexamine the dynamic income smoothing process proposed by 
Liu and Ryan (2006). In the 1990s’ economic boom, banks rimmed their income using loan loss 
provisions and created excessive reserves, effectively raising attention of regulators. In 1994, the 
General Accounting Office asserted that some banks created large portion of loan loss allowance 
that has no evidence of potentially supporting the possible loss. Later, SEC investigated the 
SunTrust bank and forced them to reduce their loan loss allowance by 100 million dollars. In 2001, 
SEC issued SAB 102 to regulate banks to adopt consistent methodology in estimating loan loss 
allowance. To this effect, Liu and Ryan (2006) propose that banks which smooth their income 
would obscure their behavior by using loan charge-offs and recoveries to achieve a stable loan loss 
allowance. In particular, Liu and Ryan (2006) hypothesize that banks which smooth their income 
would accelerate loan charge-offs during economic upturns and recover them in the next period; 
and banks with more recoveries would record more charge-offs at the same period to achieve stable 
loan loss allowances. Since most of the community banks are regulated by FFIEC, and community 
banks that are publicly traded are supervised by SEC, we hypothesize that consistent with 
commercial banks, community banks smooth loan loss allowance using charge-offs to avoid 
scrutiny from regulators.  
H4: In community banks, banks accelerating loan charge-offs when they have excessive allowance 
and recovering them the next year and recording more loan charge-offs when they have more loan 
recoveries at the same year.  
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CHAPTER 4 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA 
We use annual data of U.S. community banks from January 2001 to December 2016. We consider 
data after 2001 for two reasons. First, after 2001, there has been no regulatory changes except the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 9 Financial Instruments published in 2014 that 
replaces International Accounting Standards (IAS) 39 and becomes effective in 2017. Second, the 
data reporting for call reports changed significantly between 1976 and 2000.  
Our sample is constructed using three sources of information. The first source of 
information is accounting information of banks. In U.S., all regulated banks are required to file the 
Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (referred as call report), quarterly to provide 
financial and operation information to regulators. All the call report information is maintained by 
analysts at FDIC and publicly available. Therefore, call report data is the widely used data by 
regulators, investors and researchers. We obtain our desired accounting information by extracting 
information from banks’ call reports3, from Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.  
The second source of information is regional economic information. Federal Reserve Bank 
of Philadelphia releases state coincident indexes and state leading indexes constructed by 
Theodore Crone and Alan Clayton-Matthews4. The state coincident indexes are constructed using 
nonfarm payroll employment, average hours worked in manufacturing by production workers, the 
unemployment rate, and wage and salary disbursements deflated by the consumer price index (U.S. 
city average). The state coincident indexes are calculated monthly after Bureau of Labor Statistics 
publish the unemployment rate information for each state. The state leading indexes are modeled 
using the state coincident indexes and other factors which affect the long-term economy, and these 
indexes tend to predict the six-month changes in the state coincident indexes. Since we analyze 
annual earnings smoothing at community banks, to convert the monthly data to yearly data, we 
subtract the monthly value of state coincident indexes in January from that in December to estimate 
annual change in the coincident indexes yearly; and we take average of the state leading indexes 
for the last three months and last twelve months from a year end to reflect the regional economic 
                                                             
3 The type of call reports used in our study is Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income for a Bank with 
Domestic Offices Only (FEIEC 041). 
4 See Crone, Theodore M., and Alan Clayton-Matthews. “Consistent Economic Indexes for the 50 States,” Review 
of Economics and Statistics, 87 (2005), pp. 593-603. 
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change in next given year. Apart from the state-level economic indexes, we also include other 
economic variables used in previous studies. We derive the unemployment rate data from Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, and Case-Shiller index and GDP data are from Federal Reserve Economic Data 
maintained by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
The third source of information is the range of community banks. Although studies to date 
define community banks as those which focus on traditional lending and deposits gathering 
activities and mainly conduct business locally, it has been difficult for researchers to identify 
community banks in practice. Many previous researches adopted a billion dollars as a fixed cutoff 
in size to identify community banks. Another generally used restriction is a bank must not be a 
part of multi-bank holding company. In 2012, FDIC publishes a community banking study and it 
proposes a new way of defining community banks. It clearly points out the disadvantages of 
previous definition used to select the sample of community banks. First, the fixed size cutoff does 
not consider the inflation, growth of the industry as well as the economy. Second, the size itself 
cannot define the types of business banks are engaged in. Third, the size cutoff does not consider 
the geographic scope of business. Therefore, the new approach FDIC used to define community 
banks is only loosely related to size and includes more geographic and business activities 
information. Instead of using a fixed cutoff of size, they impose different size limit at different 
periods. Between 1985 and 2010, the size limit is 250 million dollars, and the limit is 1 billion 
dollars after 2010. They also gather other information such as loan to assets ratio and core deposits 
to assets ratio to control the types of business banks engage in. Other than that, restrictions such 
as maximum number of offices in metropolitan area and maximum states operating in are also 
considered due to the geographic scope of community banks. 5 A brief summary of methodology 
from FDIC community banking study (2012) is presented in Graph 4.1. By using this new 
approach, FDIC constructed the data set and made it available on their website for future study 
reference. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
5 See specific method in Appendix A, FDIC community banking study (2012).  
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Graph 4.1: Summary of FDIC community banking study (2012) methodology 
 
Source: FDIC community banking study (2012) 
Gathering data from all the sources mentioned above, we construct our variables. 
Definitions and calculations of variables used are provided in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Definitions of variables 
Variable 
Name Variable Definition 
Calculation 
PLLN_A  Percentage of Loan loss provisions 
for the year over lagged total assets; 
RIAD4230/ lagged (RCON2170); 
 X  Earnings after tax plus loan loss 
provisions over lagged total assets; 
(RIAD4340+RIAD4230)/ lagged 
(RCON2170); 
ASSET Total assets in thousands of dollars; RCON2170; 
SIZE Logged lagged total assets in 
thousands of dollars; 
Logged (lagged (RCON2170)); 
DLOAN The change in total outstanding loans 
scaled by lagged total assets; 
(RCON2122-lagged (RCON2122))/ 
lagged (RCON2170); 
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LAG1_NPL Non-performing loans at the end of 
last year; 
Lagged (RCON items including past 
due 90 days or more and still accruing 
and nonaccrual loans, leases and other 
assets)/ lagged (RCON2170); 
NAL Nonaccrual loans, leases and other 
assets;  
RCON items including all the 
nonaccrual loans, leases and other 
assets /lagged (RCON2170); 
INLOAN Loans to individuals for household, 
family, and other personal 
expenditures scaled by lagged total 
assets; 
(RCONB538+RCONB539+RCON20
11)/ lagged (RCON2170); 
COMLOAN Commercial and industrial loans 
scaled by lagged total assets. 
RCON1766/ lagged (RCON2170). 
DNPA The change in the nonperforming 
assets scaled by lagged total assets; 
Yearly change in RCON items 
including past due 90 days or more 
and still accruing and nonaccrual 
loans, leases and other assets/lagged 
(RCON2170); 
LEAD_DNP
A 
One year ahead DNPA;  
LAG1_DNP
A 
First lag of DNPA;  
LAG2_DNP
A 
Second lag of DNPA;  
LAG3_DNP
A 
Third lag of DNPA;  
CAP_EA Equity to asset ratio; RCON3210/RCON2170; 
LAG1_ 
CAP_EA 
Equity to asset ratio at the end of last 
year; 
 
ALL Allowance at the end of the year 
scaled by lagged total assets; 
RIAD3123/ lagged (RCON2170); 
LAG1_ALL Allowance at the end of last year 
scaled by lagged total assets; 
RIADB522/ lagged (RCON2170); 
REC Recoveries on loans and leases scaled 
by lagged total assets; 
RIAD4605/ lagged (RCON2170); 
NLCO Net loan charge-offs on loans and 
leases scaled by lagged total assets; 
(RIAD4635-RIAD4605)/ lagged 
(RCON2170); 
GLCO Gross loan charge-offs on loans and 
leases; 
RIAD4635/ lagged (RCON2170); 
LAG1_GLC
O 
First lag of GLCO;  
PERIOD1 Dummy variable equals to 1 if it is 
year before 2008; 
 
PERIOD2 Dummy variable equals to 1 if it is 
year between 2008 to 2010; 
 
PERIOD3 Dummy variable equals to 1 if it is 
year after 2010; 
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All the codes used to construct the accounting variables are from Consolidated Reports of 
Condition and Income for A Bank with Domestic Offices Only—FFIEC 041 200103 form. 
We include almost all the accounting variables used in previous loan loss provisioning 
models. Following Laeven and Majnoni (2003), accounting variables are scaled by lagged asset to 
avoid potential endogeneity problem. DCOIN (change in coincident indexes) is a variable 
BHC Dummy variable equals to 1 if the 
community bank is part of bank 
holding company; 
 
X_BHC Interaction between variable X and 
BHC;  
 
DGDP  The yearly change in GDP;  
LEAD_3M Last three months average at the end 
of a year of the state leading index 
from Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia scaled by 100; 
 
LEAD_12M Last twelve months average at the 
end of a year of the state leading 
index from Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia scaled by 100; 
 
BHC_LEAD
_3M 
Interaction between variable 
LEAD_3M and BHC; 
 
DCOIN The yearly change in the state 
coincident index from Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia scaled 
by 100; 
 
CSRET The yearly return on Case-Shiller 
U.S. National Home Price Index from 
Federal Reserve Economic Data; 
 
DUNRATE The yearly change in the 
unemployment rate from Bureau of 
Labor Statistics; 
 
HOM_PER The percentage of homogeneous 
loans scaled by lagged total asset; 
 
X_HOM The interaction between variable X 
and HOM_PER (the percentage of 
homogeneous loans scaled by lagged 
total asset); 
 
HIGH_ROA dummy variable equals to 1 if a 
bank’s ROA exceeds the median 
ROA of all banks of the year; 
 
X_ROA The interaction between variable X 
and HIGH_ROA (dummy variable 
equals to 1 if a bank’s ROA exceeds 
the median ROA of all banks of the 
year). 
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represents the current economic change. Since the coincident index from Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia releases monthly, we convert the monthly data to yearly data by subtracting the index 
at the beginning of the year from the index at the end of the year. LEAD_3M (lead index, 3 months 
average) and LEAD_12M (lead index, 12 months average) are both economic lead indicators. As 
explained above, the lead index from Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia estimates the change 
in coincident index for next six months. We take average of the lead index at last three months and 
last twelve months respectively to represent the future economic changes. In addition, we include 
some dummy variables. To control for financial crisis, we use dummies PERIOD 1(year 2001 to 
2007) to PERIOD 3 (year after 2010). To see the effect of a community bank being part of a bank 
holding company, we include BHC (dummy for community banks that are part of bank holding 
companies). 
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CHAPTER 5 
METHODOLOGY 
Beatty and Liao (2014) summarize the important loan loss provisioning models from the existing 
literature. Since there is no consensus an optimal loan loss provisioning model, we select five 
models based on models proposed in the new capital regime (post-BASEL). We denote these five 
models as Model 1-5 and they are respectively from: Laeven and Majnoni (2003), Liu and Ryan 
(2006), Kanagaretnam et al. (2010), Bushman and Williams (2012), and Beck and 
Narayanamoorthy (2013). Following Beatty and Liao (2014), we select these five models and 
further test our hypotheses 1-3. Model 1-5 are as follows:  𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑁_𝐴 = 𝑎( + 𝑎*𝑋 + 𝑎,𝐷𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 + 𝑎/𝐷𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝑎1𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷1 + 𝑎6𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷3 + 𝜀 .............(5.1)                                                                                    𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑁_𝐴 = 𝑎( + 𝑎*𝑋 + 𝑎,𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝑅𝑂𝐴+𝑎/𝑋_𝐻𝑂𝑀 + 𝑎1𝑋_𝑅𝑂𝐴 +	𝑎6𝐷𝑁𝑃𝐴 + 𝑎<𝐶𝐴𝑃_𝐸𝐴 +𝑎>𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷1 + 𝑎?𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷3 + 𝜀 ..............................................................................................(5.2)                                                                                                                                                                                                                          𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑁_𝐴 = 𝑎( + 𝑎*𝑋 + 𝑎,𝐿𝐴𝐺1_𝐴𝐿𝐿 + 𝑎/𝐿𝐴𝐺1_𝑁𝑃𝐿 + 𝑎1𝑁𝐿𝐶𝑂 + 𝑎6𝐷𝑁𝑃𝐴 + 𝑎<𝐷𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 +𝑎>𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷1 + 𝑎?𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷3 + 𝜀 ..............................................................................................(5.3)                                                                                                                                                                                                                 𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑁_𝐴 = 	𝑎( + 𝑎*𝐷𝑁𝑃𝐴 + 𝑎,𝐿𝐸𝐴𝐷_𝐷𝑁𝑃𝐴 + 𝑎/𝐿𝐴𝐺1_𝐷𝑁𝑃𝐴 + 𝑎1𝐿𝐴𝐺2_𝐷𝑁𝑃𝐴 +𝑎6𝐷𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝑎<𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝑎>𝐿𝐴𝐺1_𝐶𝐴𝑃_𝐸𝐴 + 𝑎?𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷1 + 𝑎C𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷3 + 𝜀 .......................(5.4)                                                𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑁_𝐴 = 𝑎( + 𝑎*𝑋 + 𝑎,𝐿𝐴𝐺1_𝐴𝐿𝐿 + 𝑎/𝐷𝑁𝑃𝐴 + 𝑎1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝑎6𝐺𝐿𝐶𝑂 + 𝑎<𝐼𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 +𝑎>𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 + 𝑎?𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑇 + 𝑎C𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷1 + 𝑎*(𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷3 + 𝜀 ............................................(5.5)                                                                                                                                            
The most commonly used control variable in these five models is the change in the non-
performing loans. The change in the non-performing loans (DNPA) is expected to predict the next 
year’s nonperforming loans. Collins et al. (1995) use the change in the non-performing loans 
representing the default risk of loan portfolios and find the coefficients on DNPA load with a 
significantly positive sign. Consistent with Collins et al. (1995), Ahmed et al. (1999) and Liu and 
Ryan (2006) also use the same variable in their models and report the coefficients are significantly 
positive. Bushman and Williams (2012) use the change in the non-performing loans in different 
time periods - future, current and past two years in their model and find that all these variables 
load with significantly positive coefficients. 
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Laeven and Majnoni (2003) include the change in the outstanding loans (DLOAN) in loan 
loss provisioning regression to control for bank risk. They argue the more rapidly the loans grow, 
the more risk the loans portfolio will have due to less supervision. However, contrary to their 
expectation, Laven and Majnoni find the loan growth rate is significantly negatively related to loan 
loss provisions. Their results show that banks are less prudent estimating loan loss provisions when 
it comes to rapidly expanded loans portfolios. Kanagaretnam et al. (2010) also include DLOAN in 
their model, and they consider the variable can be related to loan loss provisions in either direction 
because of the uncertainty of the nature of loans increased. Nevertheless, the coefficient on 
DLOAN is not significant in their model.  
Kanagaretnam et al. (2010) and Beck and Narayanamoorthy (2013) use the last year-end 
loan loss allowance (LAG1_ALL) in their models, Kanagaretnam et al. (2010) points out the more 
the last year-end loan loss allowance, the lesser the required loan loss provisions. Both studies find 
the relationship between LAG1_ALL and loan loss provisions is significantly negative. Similarly, 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2010) add the last year-end non-performing loans in their model, because the 
higher the level of last year-end non-performing loans (LAG1_NPL), the higher the level of loan 
loss provisions. But their result does not show any significance of LAG1_NPL. 
 Kanagaretnam et al. (2010) and Beck and Narayanamoorthy (2013) use net loan charge-
offs (NLCO) and gross loan charge-offs (GLCO) respectively, and coefficients on these two 
variables are all significantly positive. Beaver and Engel (1996) argue current loan charge-offs can 
provide information of future charge-offs, therefore provide information of future non-performing 
loans which affect loan loss provisions.  
Liu and Ryan (2006) and Bushman and Williams (2012) use tier 1 capital ratio and its lag 
to control for the regulatory purposes and they find no significance of the variable in Liu and Ryan 
(2006)’s model and significantly negative in Bushman and Williams (2012)’s. The reason for the 
variable not being significant in Liu and Ryan (2006)’s model is that they only focus on the boom 
period, therefore it is highly likely banks are all well capitalized. Capital ratio is widely used in 
loan loss provisioning models. At pre-BASEL period, loan loss allowance can be counted as tier 
1 capital, as a result, an increase in loan loss provisions leads to an increase in tier 1 capital ratio. 
At post-BASEL period, loan loss allowance is no longer a part of tier 1 capital, therefore, tier 1 
capital ratio decreases when loan loss provisions increase. Moyer (1990) provides evidence that 
during pre-BASEL period, banks manipulate the timing of provisions due to capital requirement. 
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Beatty (1995) asserts loan charge-offs, loan loss provisions, and the decision to issue securities are 
jointly determined, probably because all three are used to meet capital requirement. And banks 
trade accruals for meeting the capital requirement. Collins et al. (1995) on the contrary find a 
positive relation between loan loss provisions and capital ratio. They explain this inconsistent 
result is possibly related to model specification. Compared with studies at pre-BASEL period, 
there are less studies related to capital ratio at post-BASEL period. Kim and Kross (1998) and 
Ahmed et al. (1999) research post-BASEL period, and they find less incentives for banks to 
indulge in capital management. 
Size control is used in Bushman and Williams (2012) and Beck and Narayanamoorthy 
(2013) to control for potential size effect on loan loss provisions. Bushman and Williams (2012) 
find the coefficient on size significantly positive while Beck and Narayanamoorthy (2013) do not 
find it significant. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) propose a positive relation between loan loss 
provisions and size because of the political cost. A larger bank can attract more attention from the 
regulators and therefore allocates more in loan loss provisions. Moyer (1990) includes the natural 
log of earnings as a size measure and finds size is significantly negatively associated with loan 
loss provisions, which is contrary to their expectation. Kim and Kross (1998) apply size control 
and they find it significantly positive.  
Kanagaretnam et al. (2010) include six loan categories in their model to control for any 
additional effect that loan composition might bring. As explained by Kanagaretnam et al. (2010), 
riskier loans such as commercial loans can lead to more loan loss provisions. Their results show 
that commercial loans have significantly positive effect on loan loss provisions, and consumer 
loans have significantly negative effect on loan loss provisions. Beck and Narayanamoorthy (2013) 
control only these two loan categories in their study, and the results show a significant coefficient 
only for commercial loans. 
Except variables representing accounting information, loan loss provisioning models have 
also used many macroeconomic variables. Laeven and Majnoni (2003) and Bushman and Williams 
(2012) incorporate the change in the GDP (DGDP) in their models to control for the overall 
economy. Laeven and Majnoni (2003) discover that on average banks record less provisions when 
economy grows, but DGDP loads with an insignificant coefficient in the model of Bushman and 
Williams (2012). Beck and Narayanamoorthy (2013) include change in the unemployment rate 
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(DUNRATE) and return on Case-Shiller index (CSRET) as macroeconomic variables, and both 
these variables load with statistically significant coefficients. 
We keep almost all the variables used in Laeven and Majnoni (2003), Liu and Ryan (2006), 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2010), Bushman and Williams (2012), and Beck and Narayanamoorthy 
(2013). Whereas, models are tailored in our specific case. First, time indicators are added to control 
for the financial crisis in 2008. Second, Laeven and Majnoni (2003) claim scaling variables by last 
year-end asset can avoid potential endogeneity problem, following Laeven and Majnoni (2003), 
we scale variables using last year-end asset. Third, all the models use bank-specific effect. Fourth, 
some variables used in literature are dropped because of collinearity problem. For instance, 
DUNRATE is dropped because it is highly correlated with CSRET in our sample. After these 
modifications, we derive five loan loss provisioning models to test our hypotheses 1-3. 
To examine hypothesis 1 that the community banks use loan loss provisions for earning 
management, we use our core Models 1-5. We expect a positive and significant relation between 
percentage of loan loss provisions for the year over lagged total assets (PLLN_A) and our key 
dependent variable, earnings after tax plus loan loss provisions over lagged total assets (X) in all 
five models which indicates community banks estimate more loan loss provisions when they have 
more earnings.  
We add X_BHC in Models 1-5 to test hypothesis 2. BHC is a dummy variable takes value 
of 1 if a community bank is part of a bank holding company. X_BHC is the interaction between 
BHC and X, which enable us to capture the heterogeneity in earning management between 
community banks which are part of bank holding companies and standalone community banks. A 
community bank which is part of a bank holding company can be controlled by another bank 
holding company or itself be the top parent bank holding company. We also tend to include BHC 
to control for any direct effect from being a bank holding company, however, we could not include 
BHC since it is highly correlated with X_BHC. The coefficient on X_BHC is expected to be 
significant and negative, since being part of a bank holding company can diversify risks. 
We add LEAD_3M in Models 1-5 to test hypothesis 3. LEAD_3M is a 3-months averages 
of state economic lead indicator. We also have 12-months averages, LEAD_12M, while 
LEAD_3M and LEAD_12M are highly correlated. We choose LEAD_3M as the variable 
represents future local economic change information banks have. In addition, other 
macroeconomic variables are dropped in Models 1-5 due to collinearity problem. We expect the 
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coefficient on LEAD_3M to be significant and negative. This would indicate that local economic 
variations affect loan loss provisioning in community banks. 
We use dynamic income smoothing models proposed by Liu and Ryan (2006) to test our 
hypothesis 4. Liu and Ryan (2006) treat charge-offs discretionary and they propose that in order 
to keep loan loss allowance relatively stable to avoid examination by regulators, banks use loan 
charge-offs and recoveries to achieve a dynamic income smoothing process. The dynamic income 
smoothing models tested in our study are as follows: 𝑅𝐸𝐶 = 𝑎( + 𝑎*𝐿𝐴𝐺1_𝐺𝐿𝐶𝑂 + 𝑎,𝐵𝐻𝐶 + 𝑎/𝐵𝐻𝐶_𝐿𝐺𝐿𝐶𝑂 + 𝑎1𝐿𝐴𝐺1_𝐶𝐴𝑃_𝐸𝐴 + 𝑎6𝐷𝑁𝑃𝐴 +𝑎<𝐿𝐴𝐺1_𝐷𝑁𝑃𝐴 + 𝑎>𝐿𝐴𝐺2_𝐷𝑁𝑃𝐴 + 𝑎?𝐿𝐴𝐺3_𝐷𝑁𝑃𝐴 + 𝑎C𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝑎*(𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷1 +𝑎**𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷3 + 𝑎*,𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑅 + 𝜀 ..........................................................................(5.6)                                                                                                                        𝐺𝐿𝐶𝑂 = 𝑎( + 𝑎*𝑅𝐸𝐶 + 𝑎,𝐵𝐻𝐶 + 𝑎/𝐵𝐻𝐶_𝑅𝐸𝐶 + 𝑎1𝐶𝐴𝑃_𝐸𝐴 + 𝑎6𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑁_𝐴 + 𝑎<𝐿𝐴𝐺1_𝐴𝐿𝐿 +𝑎>𝐷𝑁𝑃𝐴 + 𝑎?𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝑎C𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷1 + 𝑎*(𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷3 + 𝑎**𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑅 + 𝜀 ............(5.7)                              
 Compared with models developed by Liu and Ryan (2006), Model 6-7 include a BHC 
dummy, an interaction between BHC and lag variable of gloss loan charge-offs, time indicators 
and local economic indicators. BHC and an interaction between BHC and recoveries on loans and 
leases scaled by lagged total assets (REC) denoted as BHC_REC are used to capture any possible 
effects in dynamic income smoothing from being part of a bank holding company. Time indicators 
capture effects from financial crisis, and local economic indicators capture local economic 
information in dynamic income smoothing. The coefficient on lagged gross loan charge-offs 
(LAG1_GLCO) of Model 6 is expected to be significantly positive, which shows the higher the 
previous year’s charge-offs, the higher this year’s recoveries. In addition, we expect the coefficient 
on REC of Model 7 to be significant and positive. This suggests the more recoveries this year, the 
more charge-offs would be recorded at the same year.  
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CHAPTER 6 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 6.1 reports descriptive statistics of our sample after winsorization at 1% level at both tails. 
We have 8,485 individual banks in our sample and 74,630 bank-year observations. We note, on 
average, community banks allocate 0.35% of their last year-end assets as their loan loss provisions, 
however, they range from minimum of -0.50% to maximum of 6.02% of the last year-end assets. 
A phenomenon noteworthy is that some banks record negative loan loss provisions. Banks record 
negative loan loss provisions when newly estimated loan loss allowance is less than the balance of 
loan loss allowance account (Stephen, 2013). The average asset of community banks is 0.29 
billion, and maximum 4.1 billion. Different from previous community banking study, large banks 
as large as 4.1 billion are also included in our study. Whereas, asset at 75 percentiles is 0.32 billion, 
which infers that majority of banks in our sample are small community banks. We can also notice 
most of the community banks in our sample have a flat rate of loan loss allowance, generally 1% 
of the last year-end asset. The BHC dummy’s mean is 0.82, which indicates 82% of community 
banks in our sample are part of bank holding companies, and 18% of community banks in our 
sample are standalone banks not related to bank holding companies. 
Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Mdn 0.75 Max 
PLLN_A 74630 0.35 0.59 -0.50 0.06 0.17 0.17     
0.38 
6.02 
ASSET 74630 290000.
00 
410000
.00 
12826.
00 
79095.
00 
150000.
00 
320 00.
00 
4100000.
00 X 74630 0. 1 0 1 -0. 3 0. 1 0. 1 0. 2 0. 4
DNPA 74630 0.00 0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 
ALL 74630 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 
NLCO 74630 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 
GLCO 74630 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 
DLOAN 74630 0.04 0.09 -0.19 -0.01 0.03 0.07 0.54 
SIZE 74630 11.95 1.03 9.44 11.23 11.90 12.63 15.11 
CAP_EA 74630 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.23 
REC 74630 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
NAL 74630 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.13 
INLOAN 74630 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.28 
COMLOA
N 
74630 0.10 0.07 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.41 
DGDP 74630 2.07 1.45 -2.80 1.70 2.40 2.70 4.40 
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PLLN_A: Percentage of Loan loss provisions for the year over lagged total assets. ASSET: Total 
assets in thousands of dollars; X: Earnings after tax plus loan loss provisions over lagged total 
assets. DNPA: The change in the nonperforming assets scaled by lagged total assets; ALL: 
Allowance at the end of the year scaled by lagged total assets; NLCO: Net loan charge-offs on 
loans and leases; GLCO: Gross loan charge-offs on loans and leases; DLOAN: The change in 
total outstanding loans scaled by lagged total assets. ASSET: Total assets in thousands of dollars; 
SIZE: Logged lagged total assets in thousands of dollars; CAP_EA: Equity to asset ratio; REC: 
Recoveries on loans and leases; NAL: Nonaccrual loans, leases and other assets; INLOAN: 
Loans to individuals for household, family, and other personal expenditures scaled by lagged 
total assets; COMLOAN: Commercial and industrial loans scaled by lagged total assets; DGDP: 
The change in GDP. LEAD_3M: Last three months average at the end of a year of the state 
leading index from Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia; LEAD_12M: Last twelve months 
average at the end of a year of the state leading index from Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
scaled by 100; DCOIN: The yearly change in the state coincident index from Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia scaled by 100; DUNRATE: The yearly change in the unemployment rate 
from Bureau of Labor Statistics; CSRET: The yearly return on Case-Shiller U.S. National Home 
Price Index from Federal Reserve Economic Data; BHC: Dummy variable equals to 1 if the 
community bank is part of bank holding company. 
Table 6.2 provides the pairwise correlation coefficients of regression variables. Accounting 
variables and economic variables are measured separately. As we can see from Panel A of Table 
6.2, the net loan charge-offs and gross loan charge-offs have the strongest correlation with loan 
loss provisions. It is reasonable since charge-offs are directly related to loan loss provisions. Panel 
B shows the correlations of economic variables, the state-level economic indicators are highly 
correlated. 
 
 
LEAD_3
M 
74630 0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 
LEAD_12
M 
74630 0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 
DCOIN 74630 0.04 0.04 -0.17 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.17 
DUNRAT
E 
74630 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 
CSRET 74630 0.04 0.07 -0.13 -0.03 0.06 0.10 0.14 
BHC 74630 0.82 0.39 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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Table 6.2: Correlations of accounting variables and economic variables 
Panel A: Correlations of accounting variables 
 PLLN_A X DNPA ALL NLCO GLCO 
PLLN_A 1      
X -0.07* 1     
DNPA 0.31* 0.06* 1    
ALL 0.56* -0.03* 0.14* 1   
NLCO 0.87* -0.16* 0.11* 0.47* 1  
GLCO 0.85* -0.16* 0.09* 0.50* 0.98* 1 
DLOAN -0.13* 0.26* 0.10* -0.01* -0.28* -0.28* 
SIZE 0.07* 0.07* 0.03* 0.05* 0.05* 0.04* 
CAP_EA -0.19* 0.14* -0.06* -0.09* -0.16* -0.15* 
REC 0.09* -0.05* -0.12* 0.30* 0.16* 0.32* 
NAL 0.60* -0.28* 0.39* 0.54* 0.60* 0.60* 
INLOAN -0.03* 0.21* 0.02* -0.08* -0.05* -0.03* 
COMLOAN 0.10* 0.18* 0.06* 0.19* 0.04* 0.04* 
 DLO
AN 
SIZE CAP_EA REC NAL INLOAN COMLOAN 
DLOAN 1       
SIZE 0.07* 1      
CAP_EA -0.05* -0.12* 1     
REC -0.11* -0.05* 0.03* 1    
NAL -0.24* 0.09* -0.13* 0.15* 1   
INLOAN 0.11* -0.29* -0.01 0.11* -0.18* 1  
COMLOAN 0.35* 0.04* -0.13* 0.03* -0.02* 0.03* 1 
Panel B: Correlations of economic variables 
 DGDP LEAD_3
M 
LEAD_12
M 
DCOIN DUNRAT
E 
CSRET 
DGDP 1      
LEAD_3M 0.34* 1     
LEAD_12
M 
0.30* 0.83* 1    
DCOIN 0.52* 0.78* 0.69* 1   
DUNRAT
E 
-0.78* -0.59* -0.52* -0.76* 1  
CSRET 0.67* 0.20* 0.27* 0.31* -0.53* 1 
PLLN_A: Percentage of Loan loss provisions for the year over lagged total assets. X: Earnings 
after tax plus loan loss provisions over lagged total assets. DNPA: The change in the 
nonperforming assets scaled by lagged total assets; ALL: Allowance at the end of the year scaled 
by lagged total assets; NLCO: Net loan charge-offs on loans and leases; GLCO: Gross loan 
charge-offs on loans and leases; DLOAN: The change in total outstanding loans scaled by lagged 
total assets; SIZE: Logged lagged total assets in thousands of dollars; CAP_EA: Equity to asset 
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ratio; REC: Recoveries on loans and leases; NAL: Nonaccrual loans, leases and other assets; 
INLOAN: Loans to individuals for household, family, and other personal expenditures scaled by 
lagged total assets; COMLOAN: Commercial and industrial loans scaled by lagged total assets; 
DGDP: The change in GDP; LEAD_3M: Last three months average at the end of a year of the 
state leading index from Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia; LEAD_12M: Last twelve 
months average at the end of a year of the state leading index from Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia scaled by 100; DCOIN: The yearly change in the state coincident index from 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia scaled by 100; DUNRATE: The yearly change in the 
unemployment rate from Bureau of Labor Statistics; CSRET: The yearly return on Case-Shiller 
U.S. National Home Price Index from Federal Reserve Economic Data.  
* Significance at a 1% level.
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6.2 Regresion Results  
 Table 6.3 reports results based on all five loan loss provisioning models we define in 
section 4. A positive and significant coefficient on X represents the existence of earning 
management, more specifically, the evidence of use of loan loss provisions to smooth earnings. 
All the models tested show the earning management behavior of community banks. In column 1, 
we use Laeven and Majnoni (2003) model, and we find that our key test variable X loads with a 
positive and significant (at 1% level) coefficient. In column 2, we use Liu and Ryan (2006) model 
and find the coefficient of our test variable X loads with a positive and significant coefficient (at 
1% level). In column 3, we run Kanagaretnam et al. (2010)’s model, and we discover X loads with 
positive and significant (at 1% level) coefficient. In column 4, we regress Bushman and Williams 
(2012)’s model, and we find our test variable X loads with a positive and significant coefficient 
(at 1% level). In column 5, we regress Beck and Narayanamoorthy (2013)’ model, and we find X 
loads with a significant (at 1% level) and positive coefficient. Overall, result from table 6.3 
provides strong evidence that community banks use loan loss provisions to smooth income, 
supporting our hypothesis 1.  
Table 6.3: Loan loss provisions regressions from literature 
  
(Laeven 
and 
Majnoni, 
2003) 
(Liu and 
Ryan, 
2006) 
(Kanagaretn
am etal., 
 2010) 
(Bushma
n and 
Williams, 
2012) 
(Beck and 
Narayanmoorth
y, 2013) 
VARIABLES PLLN_A PLLN_A PLLN_A PLLN_A PLLN_A 
            
X 3.976*** 16.851*** 3.714*** 2.537*** 4.054*** 
 (0.902) (1.647) (0.433) (0.938) (0.439) 
HIGH_ROA  -0.534***    
  (0.013)    
X_HOM  14.401***    
  (2.302)    
X_ROA  -
11.495*** 
   
  (1.589)    
LAG1_ALL   -27.803***  -30.355*** 
   (1.237)  (1.295) 
LAG1_NPL   0.178   
   (0.246)   
NLCO   102.161***   
   (0.653)   
DNPA  9.349*** 7.584*** 12.127**
* 
8.317*** 
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  (0.377) (0.268) (0.458) (0.239) 
DLOAN -
1.235*** 
 0.073**   
 (0.046)  (0.029)   
PERIOD1 -
0.448*** 
-0.291*** -0.112*** -
0.359*** 
-0.134*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) 
PERIOD3 -
0.469*** 
-0.257*** -0.091*** -
0.248*** 
-0.107*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) 
DGDP -
0.017*** 
  0.002  
 ( .002)   (0.002)  
CAP_EA  -5.730***    
  (0.229)    
LEAD_DNPA    -
1.790*** 
 
    (0.373)  
LAG1_DNPA    14.916**
* 
 
    (0.412)  
LAG2_DNPA    10.989**
* 
 
    (0.318)  
SIZE    0.020 0.009 
    (0.016) (0.007) 
LAG1_CAP_EA    -0.210  
    (0.221)  
GLCO     99.322*** 
     (0.655) 
INLOAN     0.214*** 
     (0.082) 
COMLOAN     0.419*** 
     (0.044) 
CSRET     0.044** 
     (0.018) 
Constant 0.756*** 1.474*** 0.344*** 0.306 0.175* 
 (0.013) (0.029) (0.014) (0.197) (0.090) 
      
Observations 74,630 74,630 66,145 50,772 74,630 
R-squared 0.190 0.361 0.803 0.322 0.784 
Number of banks 8,485 8,485 7,962 6,888 8,485 
R2 within 0.190 0.361 0.803 0.322 0.784 
R2 overall 0.145 0.329 0.804 0.278 0.786 
R2 between 0.107 0.331 0.848 0.261 0.821 
F-stat 725.7 922.1 6039 502.8 4340 
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0 
PLLN_A: Percentage of Loan loss provisions for the year over lagged total assets; X: Earnings 
after tax plus loan loss provisions over lagged total assets. HIGH_ROA: dummy variable equals 
to 1 if a bank’s ROA exceeds the median ROA of all banks of the year. X_HOM: The interaction 
between variable X and HOM_PER (the percentage of homogeneous loans scaled by lagged total 
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asset). X_ROA: The interaction between variable X and HIGH_ROA (dummy variable equals to 
1 if a bank’s ROA exceeds the median ROA of all banks of the year). DLOAN: The change in 
total outstanding loans scaled by lagged total assets; PERIOD1: Dummy variable equals to 1 if it 
is year before 2008; PERIOD3: Dummy variable equals to 1 if it is year after 2010; DGDP: The 
change in GDP; DNPA: The change in the nonperforming assets scaled by lagged total assets; 
CAP_EA: Equity to asset ratio; LAG1_ALL: Allowance at the end of last year scaled by lagged 
total assets; LAG1_NPL: Non-performing loans at the end of last year; NLCO: Net loan charge-
offs on loans and leases; LEAD_DNPA: One year ahead DNPA; LAG1_DNPA: First lag of 
DNPA; LAG2_DNPA: Second lag of DNPA; SIZE: Logged lagged total assets in thousands of 
dollars; LAG1_CAP_EA: Equity to asset ratio at the end of the year; GLCO: Gross loan charge-
offs on loans and leases; INLOAN: Loans to individuals for household, family, and other 
personal expenditures scaled by lagged total assets; COMLOAN: Commercial and industrial 
loans scaled by lagged total assets; CSRET: The yearly return on Case-Shiller U.S. National 
Home Price Index from Federal Reserve Economic Data. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 As for the control variables of these five models, we find different result from Liu and 
Ryan (2006) on coefficient of HIGH_ROA (a dummy takes 1 when a bank has above-median 
ROA) and X_ROA (an interaction between X and HIGH_ROA). Liu and Ryan (2006) propose a 
positive coefficient of X_ROA by arguing the more profitable banks tend to have more aggressive 
earning management during boom. However, our result finds the opposite result. The reason might 
be instead of studying the banks during boom, we include both boom and bust periods, and use 
time indicators in our regressions. In addition, the coefficient of one year ahead DNPA 
(LEAD_DNPA) is also find at an opposite direction, whereas the coefficients on lag one of DNPA 
(LAG1_DNPA) and lag two of DNPA (LAG2_DNPA) are as expected significantly positive. This 
result may indicate that community banks increase their loan loss provisions mainly in response 
to past nonperforming loans information. 
 The coefficients of other control variables are consistent with the literature. The result 
regarding homogenous loans is consistent with Liu and Ryan (2006)’s. We find a positive and 
significant coefficient of homogenous loans. The coefficient of last year-end loan loss allowance 
28 
 
 
scaled by lagged assets (LAG1_ALL) is significant and negative, representing the more loan loss 
allowance at last year end, the less loan loss provisions needed for this year. Consistent with 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2010), the coefficient of last year-end nonperforming loans scaled by total 
assets (LAG1_NPL) does not show any significance. NLCO and GLCO have relatively strong 
effects on loan loss provisions which are consistent with Knagaretnam et al. (2010) and 
Narayanamoorthy (2013). All the models show significantly positive coefficients on DNPA. The 
coefficients of DLOAN have inconsistent result in the literature. Laeven and Majnoni (2003) find 
a significantly negative coefficient on DLOAN, whereas, Kanagaretnam et al. (2010) do not find 
a significant result. We find consistent result with Laeven and Majnoni (2003), but the coefficient 
is significantly positive in the model of Kanagaretnam et al. (2010). Consistent with the literature, 
DGDP is significantly negative in Laeven and Majnoni (2003)’s model and not significant in 
Bushman and Williams. Capital ratios represent a significantly negative association with loan loss 
provisions. Size effect on loan loss provisions is not significant in our result. Loan compositions 
are significant in our result, and commercial loans are associated with more loan loss provisions 
compared to individual loans. Beck and Narayanamoorthy (2013) find similar result of coefficient 
on commercial loans, but they do not find any significant result for individual loans. The 
coefficients of time indicators are as expected significantly negative, which show that before and 
after financial crisis, the loan loss provisions are less on average compared with the financial crisis 
period.   
 Table 6.4 reports the result of loan loss provisions and the effect of being part of a bank 
holding company. Except in column 2, we find insignificant results on X_BHC in other four 
columns. In column 2, we find X_BHC loads with a negative and significant (at 10% level) 
coefficient. Results from other four columns do not provide evidence that supports our hypothesis 
2 that community banks that are part of bank holding companies are less aggressive in income 
smoothing. Additionally, X loads with positive and significant coefficients in all five models, 
which again provides strong evidence of income smoothing using loan loss provisions. Results for 
other control variables are consistent with the results in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.4: Loan loss provisions and the effect of bank holding company 
  
(Laeven 
and 
Majnoni, 
2003) 
(Liu and 
Ryan, 
2006) 
(Kanagaretn
am etal., 
 2010) 
(Bushma
n and 
Williams, 
2012) 
(Beck and 
Narayanmoorth
y, 2013) 
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VARIABLES PLLN_A PLLN_A PLLN_A PLLN_A PLLN_A 
            
X 3.796** 18.738*** 4.448*** 4.117** 4.692*** 
 (1.491) (1.950) (0.745) (1.738) (0.739) 
X_BHC 0.222 -2.358* -0.886 -1.857 -0.790 
 (1.454) (1.372) (0.736) (1.751) (0.713) 
HIGH_ROA  -0.536***    
  (0.013)    
X_HOM  14.221***    
  (2.283)    
X_ROA  -11.328***    
  (1.599)    
LAG1_ALL   -27.805***  -30.354*** 
   (1.237)  (1.296) 
LAG1_NPL   0.178   
   (0.246)   
NLCO   102.161***   
   (0.653)   
DNPA  9.358*** 7.585*** 12.132**
* 
8.317*** 
  (0.377) (0.268) (0.458) (0.239) 
DLOAN -
1.235*** 
 0.074***   
 (0.046)  (0.028)   
PERIOD1 -
0.448*** 
-0.292*** -0.112*** -
0.359*** 
-0.134*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) 
PERIOD3 -
0.469*** 
-0.257*** -0.091*** -
0.248*** 
-0.107*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) 
DGDP -
0.017*** 
  0.002  
 ( .002)   (0.002)  
CAP_EA  -5.742***    
  (0.230)    
LEAD_DNPA    -
1.785*** 
 
    (0.373)  
LAG1_DNPA    14.917**
* 
 
    (0.412)  
LAG2_DNPA    10.990**
* 
 
    (0.318)  
SIZE    0.020 0.010 
    (0.016) (0.007) 
LAG1_CAP_EA    -0.216  
    (0.221)  
GLCO     99.319*** 
     (0.655) 
INLOAN     0.214*** 
     (0.082) 
COMLOAN     0.421*** 
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     (0.044) 
CSRET     0.043** 
     (0.018) 
Constant 0.756*** 1.477*** 0.345*** 0.302 0.169* 
 (0.013) (0.029) (0.014) (0.197) (0.089) 
      
Observations 74,630 74,630 66,145 50,772 74,630 
R-squared 0.190 0.361 0.803 0.322 0.784 
Number of banks 8,485 8,485 7,962 6,888 8,485 
R2 within 0.190 0.361 0.803 0.322 0.784 
R2 overall 0.145 0.330 0.804 0.278 0.786 
R2 between 0.108 0.331 0.848 0.260 0.821 
F-stat 604.7 820.4 5374 457.3 3952 
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0 
PLLN_A: Percentage of Loan loss provisions for the year over lagged total assets; X: Earnings 
after tax plus loan loss provisions over lagged total assets. HIGH_ROA: dummy variable equals 
to 1 if a bank’s ROA exceeds the median ROA of all banks of the year. X_HOM: The interaction 
between variable X and HOM_PER (the percentage of homogeneous loans scaled by lagged total 
asset). X_ROA: The interaction between variable X and HIGH_ROA (dummy variable equals to 
1 if a bank’s ROA exceeds the median ROA of all banks of the year). DLOAN: The change in 
total outstanding loans scaled by lagged total assets; PERIOD1: Dummy variable equals to 1 if it 
is year before 2008; PERIOD3: Dummy variable equals to 1 if it is year after 2010; DGDP: The 
change in GDP; DNPA: The change in the nonperforming assets scaled by lagged total assets; 
CAP_EA: Equity to asset ratio; LAG1_ALL: Allowance at the end of last year scaled by lagged 
total assets; LAG1_NPL: Non-performing loans at the end of last year; NLCO: Net loan charge-
offs on loans and leases; LEAD_DNPA: One year ahead DNPA; LAG1_DNPA: First lag of 
DNPA; LAG2_DNPA: Second lag of DNPA; SIZE: Logged lagged total assets in thousands of 
dollars; LAG1_CAP_EA: Equity to asset ratio at the end of the year; GLCO: Gross loan charge-
offs on loans and leases; INLOAN: Loans to individuals for household, family, and other 
personal expenditures scaled by lagged total assets; COMLOAN: Commercial and industrial 
loans scaled by lagged total assets; CSRET: The yearly return on Case-Shiller U.S. National 
Home Price Index from Federal Reserve Economic Data; BHC: Dummy variable equals to 1 if 
the community bank is part of bank holding company; X_BHC: Interaction between variable X 
and BHC. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
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 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Table 6.5 we further test loan loss provisioning in different groups of banks, specifically, 
in non-traded standalone community banks, non-traded community banks that are part of bank 
holding companies, and in traded banks. Panel A shows the result of loan loss provisioning in non-
traded standalone community banks. Except for column 1, all other four columns show coefficients 
on X are significant and positive, indicating the income-smoothing behavior in non-traded 
standalone community banks. Panel B shows the result of loan loss provisioning in non-traded 
community banks that are part of bank holding companies. In all five models, X loads with 
significant and positive coefficient, providing strong evidence that income-smoothing behavior 
exists in non-traded community banks that are part of bank holding companies. Panel C reports 
the result of loan loss provisioning in traded community banks. The result shows that all the 
coefficients on X have insignificant loadings, except in column 5, X loads with significant (at 
10%) level and positive coefficient. Result of Table 6.5 indicates that income-smoothing behavior 
does not exist in traded community banks. One of the possible reasons could be the stricter 
scrutiny. As a public traded community banks, the banks not only under the supervision of bank 
regulators, but also under the scrutiny of SEC, analysts and stock investors. Table 6.5 also provides 
insight into the insignificant result of the effect of bank holding companies in loan loss 
provisioning. Publicly traded community banks are less aggressive in income smoothing than non-
traded community banks, however, only small portion of banks that are part of bank holding 
companies are publicly traded. Combining the results from Table 6.4 and Table 6.5, we do not 
have evidence supports the argument that diversified business of bank holding companies leads to 
a less aggressive income smoothing. 
Table 6.5: Loan loss provisioning in different groups of banks 
Panel A: loan loss provisioning in non-traded standalone community banks  
  
(Laeven 
and 
Majnoni, 
2003) 
(Liu and 
Ryan, 
2006) 
(Kanagaretn
am etal., 
 2010) 
(Bushma
n and 
Williams, 
2012) 
(Beck and 
Narayanmoorth
y, 2013) 
VARIABLES PLLN_A PLLN_A PLLN_A PLLN_A PLLN_A 
            
X 2.553 11.748*** 5.421*** 5.174** 2.983*** 
 (2.047) (3.929) (1.125) (2.503) (1.036) 
HIGH_ROA  -0.385***    
  (0.025)    
32 
 
 
X_HOM  16.944**    
  (7.194)    
X_ROA  -9.389***    
  (3.449)    
LAG1_ALL   -34.685***  -35.258*** 
   (2.681)  (2.434) 
LAG1_NPL   4.994***   
   (0.548)   
NLCO   93.998***   
   (1.668)   
DNPA  8.341*** 9.027*** 9.782*** 7.728*** 
  (0.855) (0.673) (1.085) (0.577) 
DLOAN -
0.861*** 
 0.213**   
 (0.118)  (0.098)   
PERIOD1 -
0.420*** 
-0.267*** -0.104*** -
0.266*** 
-0.157*** 
 (0.024) (0.018) (0.011) (0.026) (0.013) 
PERIOD3 -
0.476*** 
-0.303*** -0.095*** -
0.212*** 
-0.111*** 
 (0.025) (0.020) (0.011) (0.021) (0.012) 
DGDP -
0.018*** 
  -0.007  
 ( .005)   (0.006)  
CAP_EA  -5.742***    
  (0.230)    
LEAD_DNPA    -1.763*  
    (0.966)  
LAG1_DNPA    13.856**
* 
 
    (0.949)  
LAG2_DNPA    9.542***  
    (0.727)  
SIZE    0.110 -0.015 
    (0.067) (0.022) 
LAG1_CAP_EA    1.030*  
    (0.552)  
GLCO     96.622*** 
     (1.596) 
INLOAN     0.640** 
     (0.276) 
COMLOAN     0.788*** 
     (0.148) 
CSRET     0.037 
     (0.047) 
Constant 0.747*** 1.280*** 0.339*** -0.955 0.496* 
 (0.029) (0.072) (0.025) (0.797) (0.272) 
      
Observations 13,592 13,592 11,232 7,757 13,592 
R-squared 0.148 0.278 0.758 0.282 0.736 
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Number of banks 2,431 2,431 2,099 1,634 2,431 
R2 within 0.148 0.278 0.758 0.282 0.736 
R2 overall 0.133 0.247 0.735 0.169 0.726 
R2 between 0.171 0.309 0.764 0.0927 0.743 
F-stat 97.20 124.1 654.4 58.54 623.6 
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0 
Panel B: loan loss provisioning in non-traded community banks that are part of bank 
holding companies 
  
(Laeven 
and 
Majnoni, 
2003) 
(Liu and 
Ryan, 
2006) 
(Kanagaretn
am etal., 
 2010) 
(Bushma
n and 
Williams, 
2012) 
(Beck and 
Narayanmoorth
y, 2013) 
VARIABLES PLLN_A PLLN_A PLLN_A PLLN_A PLLN_A 
            
X 5.793*** 21.313*** 5.099*** 2.989*** 4.458*** 
 (1.047) (1.988) (0.474) (1.042) (0.493) 
HIGH_ROA  -0.562***    
  (0.016)    
X_HOM  10.182***    
  (2.572)    
X_ROA  -
13.050*** 
   
  (1.956)    
LAG1_ALL   -32.356***  -30.474*** 
   (1.052)  (1.287) 
LAG1_NPL   4.796***   
   (0.405)   
NLCO   98.426***   
   (0.759)   
DNPA  8.753*** 9.529*** 12.078**
* 
8.046*** 
  (0.428) (0.309) (0.518) (0.260) 
DLOAN -
1.341*** 
 0.100***   
 (0.054)  (0.029)   
PERIOD1 -
0.429*** 
-0.278*** -0.090*** -
0.363*** 
-0.124*** 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.004) (0.011) (0.005) 
PERIOD3 -
0.447*** 
-0.234*** -0.080*** -
0.252*** 
-0.102*** 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) 
DGDP -
0.016*** 
  0.005*  
 ( .002)   (0.003)  
CAP_EA  -6.309***    
  (0.272)    
LEAD_DNPA    -
1.861*** 
 
    (0.419)  
LAG1_DNPA    14.725**
* 
 
    (0.466)  
LAG2_DNPA    10.985**
* 
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    (0.360)  
SIZE    0.012 0.022*** 
    (0.017) (0.007) 
LAG1_CAP_EA    -0.452*  
    (0.260)  
GLCO     99.351*** 
     (0.715) 
INLOAN     0.141 
     (0.087) 
COMLOAN     0.348*** 
     (0.046) 
CSRET     0.053** 
     (0.021) 
Constant 0.709*** 1.509*** 0.312*** 0.412** 0.021 
 (0.016) (0.034) (0.012) (0.210) (0.091) 
      
Observations 56,683 56,683 51,121 40,288 56,683 
R-squared 0.191 0.371 0.812 0.317 0.788 
Number of banks 6,191 6,191 5,886 5,226 6,191 
R2 within 0.191 0.371 0.812 0.317 0.788 
R2 overall 0.141 0.346 0.693 0.280 0.789 
R2 between 0.0702 0.352 0.212 0.306 0.823 
F-stat 559.3 736.1 4774 397.1 3289 
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0 
Panel C: loan loss provisioning in traded banks 
  
(Laeven 
and 
Majnoni, 
2003) 
(Liu and 
Ryan, 
2006) 
(Kanagaretn
am etal., 
 2010) 
(Bushma
n and 
Williams, 
2012) 
(Beck and 
Narayanmoorth
y, 2013) 
VARIABLES PLLN_A PLLN_A PLLN_A PLLN_A PLLN_A 
            
X -2.163 4.164 2.553 -2.104 3.304* 
 (3.839) (4.808) (2.024) (3.880) (1.939) 
HIGH_ROA  -0.716***    
  (0.067)    
X_HOM  27.990***    
  (8.957)    
X_ROA  -3.829    
  (5.396)    
LAG1_ALL   -20.743**  -23.779*** 
   (8.745)  (8.633) 
LAG1_NPL   2.627*   
   (1.592)   
NLCO   103.385***   
   (2.614)   
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DNPA  14.695*** 10.930*** 18.984**
* 
10.980*** 
  (1.627) (1.130) (2.263) (1.223) 
DLOAN -
1.063*** 
 0.141*   
 ( .140)  (0.082)   
PERIOD1 -
0.767*** 
-0.458*** -0.140*** -
0.522*** 
-0.171*** 
 (0.045) (0.032) (0.016) (0.045) (0.018) 
PERIOD3 -
0.665*** 
-0.226*** -0.151*** -
0.173*** 
-0.179*** 
 (0.045) (0.032) (0.016) (0.053) (0.020) 
DGDP -0.017**   0.007  
 (0.008)   (0.009)  
CAP_EA  -8.704***    
  (1.035)    
LEAD_DNPA    -2.703*  
    (1.479)  
LAG1_DNPA    20.396**
* 
 
    (2.914)  
LAG2_DNPA    15.638**
* 
 
    (1.908)  
SIZE    -0.074 -0.022 
    (0.061) (0.022) 
LAG1_CAP_EA    -0.496  
    (0.921)  
GLCO     103.368*** 
     (3.138) 
INLOAN     0.002 
     (0.265) 
COMLOAN     0.180 
     (0.191) 
CSRET     0.067 
     (0.073) 
Constant 1.167*** 2.067*** 0.313*** 1.707** 0.607* 
 (0.061) (0.118) (0.085) (0.791) (0.334) 
      
Observations 4,355 4,355 3,792 2,727 4,355 
R-squared 0.296 0.519 0.873 0.487 0.852 
Number of banks 776 776 705 515 776 
R2 within 0.296 0.519 0.873 0.487 0.852 
R2 overall 0.227 0.428 0.881 0.378 0.861 
R2 between 0.218 0.408 0.894 0.190 0.893 
F-stat 76.55 102.1 827.3 62.89 588.3 
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0 
PLLN_A: Percentage of Loan loss provisions for the year over lagged total assets; X: Earnings 
after tax plus loan loss provisions over lagged total assets. HIGH_ROA: dummy variable equals 
to 1 if a bank’s ROA exceeds the median ROA of all banks of the year. X_HOM: The interaction 
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between variable X and HOM_PER (the percentage of homogeneous loans scaled by lagged total 
asset). X_ROA: The interaction between variable X and HIGH_ROA (dummy variable equals to 
1 if a bank’s ROA exceeds the median ROA of all banks of the year). DLOAN: The change in 
total outstanding loans scaled by lagged total assets; PERIOD1: Dummy variable equals to 1 if it 
is year before 2008; PERIOD3: Dummy variable equals to 1 if it is year after 2010; DGDP: The 
change in GDP; DNPA: The change in the nonperforming assets scaled by lagged total assets; 
CAP_EA: Equity to asset ratio; LAG1_ALL: Allowance at the end of last year scaled by lagged 
total assets; LAG1_NPL: Non-performing loans at the end of last year; NLCO: Net loan charge-
offs on loans and leases; LEAD_DNPA: One year ahead DNPA; LAG1_DNPA: First lag of 
DNPA; LAG2_DNPA: Second lag of DNPA; SIZE: Logged lagged total assets in thousands of 
dollars; LAG1_CAP_EA: Equity to asset ratio at the end of the year; GLCO: Gross loan charge-
offs on loans and leases; INLOAN: Loans to individuals for household, family, and other 
personal expenditures scaled by lagged total assets; COMLOAN: Commercial and industrial 
loans scaled by lagged total assets; CSRET: The yearly return on Case-Shiller U.S. National 
Home Price Index from Federal Reserve Economic Data; BHC: Dummy variable equals to 1 if 
the community bank is part of bank holding company; X_BHC: Interaction between variable X 
and BHC. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 6.6 reports the result of the local economic lead indicator. LEAD_3M loads with 
negative and significant (at 1% level) coefficients in all five models. This result strongly suggests 
that the local economic indicator strongly explains the loan loss provisions in community banks, 
supporting our hypothesis 3. This result is also consistent with the literature that local economic 
conditions affect community banks’ performance, consistent with the findings of Meyer and 
Yeager (2001) and Daly et al. (2003). X also loads with positive and significant (at 1% level) in 
all five models, strongly supports our hypothesis 1. X_BHC in table 6.6 loads with similar 
coefficients of table 6.4, consistent with the results in table 6.4. The control variables are similar 
to what presented in Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.6: Loan loss provisions and local economic lead indicator 
  
(Laeven 
and 
Majnoni, 
2003) 
(Liu and 
Ryan, 
2006) 
(Kanagaretna
m etal., 
 2010) 
(Bushma
n and 
Williams, 
2012) 
(Beck and 
Narayanmoorth
y, 2013) 
VARIABLES PLLN_A PLLN_A PLLN_A PLLN_A PLLN_A 
            
X 3.580** 18.621**
* 
4.474*** 4.485*** 4.743*** 
 (1.473) (1.934) (0.744) (1.728) (0.737) 
X_BHC 0.335 -2.324* -0.894 -1.975 -0.806 
 (1.438) (1.361) (0.734) (1.742) (0.712) 
LEAD_3M -
4.085*** 
-
2.640*** 
-0.434*** -
2.504*** 
-0.733*** 
 ( .206) (0.185) (0.113) (0.203) (0.110) 
HIGH_ROA  -
0.531*** 
   
  (0.013)    
X_ROA  -
11.053**
* 
   
  (1.592)    
LAG1_ALL   -27.682***  -30.108*** 
   (1.239)  (1.293) 
LAG1_NPL   0.180   
   (0.247)   
NLCO   102.050***   
   (0.653)   
DNPA  9.114*** 7.552*** 11.803**
* 
8.239*** 
  (0.374) (0.268) (0.449) (0.238) 
DLOAN -
1.194*** 
 0.076***   
 (0.046)  (0.029)   
PERIOD1 -
0.431*** 
-
0.256*** 
-0.105*** -
0.308*** 
-0.118*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) 
PERIOD3 -
0.413*** 
-
0.206*** 
-0.083*** -
0.194*** 
-0.089*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) 
CAP_EA  -
5.751*** 
   
  (0.229)    
LEAD_DNPA    -
1.958*** 
 
    (0.360)  
LAG1_DNPA    14.788**
* 
 
    (0.407)  
LAG2_DNPA    11.013**
* 
 
    (0.316)  
SIZE    0.019 0.011 
    (0.016) (0.007) 
LAG1_CAP_EA    -0.265  
    (0.220)  
GLCO     99.078*** 
     (0.655) 
38 
 
 
INLOAN     0.195** 
     (0.082) 
COMLOAN     0.420*** 
     (0.044) 
Constant 0.738*** 1.469*** 0.343*** 0.318 0.148* 
 (0.013) (0.029) (0.014) (0.194) (0.089) 
      
Observations 74,630 74,630 66,145 50,772 74,630 
R-squared 0.199 0.365 0.803 0.327 0.784 
Number of banks 8,485 8,485 7,962 6,888 8,485 
R2 within 0.199 0.365 0.803 0.327 0.784 
R2 overall 0.147 0.332 0.804 0.280 0.787 
R2 between 0.108 0.333 0.848 0.254 0.822 
F-stat 607.6 740.7 4854 459.7 3913 
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0 
PLLN_A: Percentage of Loan loss provisions for the year over lagged total assets; X: Earnings 
after tax plus loan loss provisions over lagged total assets. HIGH_ROA: dummy variable equals 
to 1 if a bank’s ROA exceeds the median ROA of all banks of the year. X_HOM: The interaction 
between variable X and HOM_PER (the percentage of homogeneous loans scaled by lagged total 
asset). X_ROA: The interaction between variable X and HIGH_ROA (dummy variable equals to 
1 if a bank’s ROA exceeds the median ROA of all banks of the year). DLOAN: The change in 
total outstanding loans scaled by lagged total assets; PERIOD1: Dummy variable equals to 1 if it 
is year before 2008; PERIOD3: Dummy variable equals to 1 if it is year after 2010; DNPA: The 
change in the nonperforming assets scaled by lagged total assets; CAP_EA: Equity to asset ratio; 
LAG1_ALL: Allowance at the end of last year scaled by lagged total assets; LAG1_NPL: Non-
performing loans at the end of last year; NLCO: Net loan charge-offs on loans and leases; 
LEAD_DNPA: One year ahead DNPA; LAG1_DNPA: First lag of DNPA; LAG2_DNPA: 
Second lag of DNPA; SIZE: Logged lagged total assets in thousands of dollars; 
LAG1_CAP_EA: Equity to asset ratio at the end of the year; GLCO: Gross loan charge-offs on 
loans and leases; INLOAN: Loans to individuals for household, family, and other personal 
expenditures scaled by lagged total assets; COMLOAN: Commercial and industrial loans scaled 
by lagged total assets; BHC: Dummy variable equals to 1 if the community bank is part of bank 
holding company; LEAD_3M: Last three months average at the end of a year of the state leading 
index from Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia scaled by 100; BHC_LEAD_3M: Interaction 
between variable LEAD_3M and BHC.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
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 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Table 6.7 shows the results of dynamic income smoothing proposed by Liu and Ryan 
(2006), the effect of being part of a bank holding company and the influence of local economic 
indicators. Dynamic income smoothing process has two parts. Panel A shows the part of recoveries 
and lagged gross loan charge-offs. In Panel A, we are interested in the coefficient of LAG1_GLCO, 
expecting the loadings on LAG1_GLCO to be significantly positive. Columns 1-4 show different 
models which include different local economic indicators. However, the results of columns 1-4 are 
similar. In column 1, we regress recovery on variables from Liu and Ryan (2006), and we do not 
include any economic variable. It turns out that LAG1_GLCO loads with a positive and significant 
(at 1% level) coefficient. In column 2, we add DCOIN into the model in column 1, and we find 
the same result on LAG1_GLCO, an we also find DCOIN loads with a negative and significant 
(at 5% level) coefficient. In column 3, we add LEAD_3M instead of DCOIN in column 2, and we 
find LEAD_3M loads with a negative and significant (at 1% level) coefficient. In column 4, we 
replace LEAD_3M in column 3 with LEAD_12M, and we find an insignificant result of 
LEAD_12M, which is contrary to our expectation. This positive association between 
LAG1_GLCO and REC shows when a community bank recorded more charge-offs, in order to 
keep their loan loss allowance flat, they will have to recover more loans. And the coefficient shows 
the recovered loans are on average 3.2% of the past gross loan charge-offs. 
Table 6.7: Dynamic income smoothing regressions 
Panel A: Recoveries and lagged gross loan charge-offs  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES RECOVER
Y 
RECOVER
Y 
RECOVER
Y 
RECOVER
Y           
LAG1_GLCO 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
BHC -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BHC_LGLCO 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
LAG1_CAP_EA 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DNPA -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LAG1_DNPA -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LAG2_DNPA -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
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 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
LAG3_DNPA -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SIZE -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PERIOD1 -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000 -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PERIOD3 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DCOIN  -0.000**   
  (0.000)   
LEAD_3M   -0.001***  
   (0.000)  
LEAD_12M    -0.000 
    (0.000) 
Constant 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Observations 50,772 50,772 50,772 50,772 
R-squared 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 
Number of banks 6,888 6,888 6,888 6,888 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 within 0.0781 0.0782 0.0784 0.0782 
R2 overall 0.0759 0.0764 0.0758 0.0754 
R2 between 0.0889 0.0897 0.0886 0.0881 
F-stat 94.31 87.41 86.49 86.80 
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 
Panel B: Gross charge-offs and recoveries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES GLCO GLCO GLCO GLCO 
          
REC 0.814*** 0.813*** 0.813*** 0.813*** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
BHC -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BHC_REC -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
CAP_EA -
0.004*** 
-
0.004*** 
-
0.004*** 
-
0.004***  ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) 
PLLN_A 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LAG1_ALL 0.336*** 0.336*** 0.336*** 0.336*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
DNPA -
0.048*** 
-
0.048*** 
-
0.048*** 
-
0.048*** 
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 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
SIZE 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PERIOD1 -
0.000*** 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 ( .000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PERIOD3 -
0.000*** 
-
0.000*** 
-
0.000*** 
-
0.000***  ( .000) ( .000) ( .000) ( .000) 
DCOIN  -0.001**   
  (0.000)   
LEAD_3M   -
0.004*** 
 
   ( .001)  
LEAD_12M    -
0.006***     ( .001) 
Constant -
0.008*** 
-
0.008*** 
-
0.008*** 
-
0.008***  ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) 
     
Observations 74,630 74,630 74,630 74,630 
R-squared 0.809 0.809 0.809 0.809 
Number of banks 8,485 8,485 8,485 8,485 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 within 0.809 0.809 0.809 0.809 
R2 overall 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.814 
R2 between 0.849 0.848 0.848 0.848 
F-stat 3776 3435 3435 3450 
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 
PLLN_A: Percentage of Loan loss provisions for the year over lagged total assets; REC: 
Recoveries on loans and leases; GLCO: Gross loan charge-offs on loans and leases; 
LAG1_GLCO: First lag of GLCO; CAP_EA: Equity to asset ratio; LAG1_CAP_EA: Equity to 
asset ratio at the end of the year; DNPA: The change in the nonperforming assets scaled by 
lagged total assets; LAG1_DNPA: First lag of DNPA; LAG2_DNPA: Second lag of DNPA; 
LAG3_DNPA: Third lag of DNPA; PERIOD1: Dummy variable equals to 1 if it is year before 
2008; PERIOD3: Dummy variable equals to 1 if it is year after 2010; SIZE: Logged lagged total 
assets in thousands of dollars; DCOIN: The yearly change in the state coincident index from 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia scaled by 100; LEAD_3M: Last three months average at 
the end of a year of the state leading index from Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia scaled by 
100. LEAD_12M: Last twelve months average at the end of a year of the state leading index 
from Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia scaled by 100; LAG1_ALL: Allowance at the end of 
last year scaled by lagged total assets; BHC: Dummy variable equals to 1 if the community bank 
is part of bank holding company; BHC_REC: interaction between variable BHC and REC. 
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Robust standard errors in parentheses  
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Panel B represents the other side of the story related to concurrent gross charge-offs and 
recoveries. The result from Panel B shows 1 percentage point increase in recoveries would increase 
gross loan charge-offs by 0.814 percentage points. This positive association between recoveries 
and charge-offs indicates that if a community bank has more recoveries, it has to record more 
charge-offs to keep loan loss allowance relatively stable. Besides, local economic indicators added 
in the models load with negative and significant coefficients. Results from Panel A and Panel B 
strongly suggests a dynamic income smoothing process in community banks, supporting our 
hypothesis 4. 
 Table 6.7 also reports any possible effect of being part of a bank holding company in 
dynamic income smoothing process. However, we do not observe any significant effect, since the 
coefficients on BHC and the interaction between BHC and LAG1_GLCO (BHC_LGLCO) are 
insignificant in the recovery regressions in panel A, and the coefficients on BHC and BHC_REC 
are insignificant in the gross loan charge-offs regressions in panel B. 
 Table 6.8 reports the result of loan loss allowance regressions. We are interested in the 
connection between loan loss allowance and local economic indicators and we find lead indicators, 
LEAD_3M and LEAD_12M, load with insignificant coefficients. The result indicates that future 
economic situation does not affect how community banks plan their loan loss allowance. We also 
find change in the coincident indicator, DCOIN, loads with a significantly positive coefficient. 
This also implies that the loan loss allowance account is more associated with the past when it 
should be more associated with the future. From this result, we can conclude the loan loss 
allowance estimation in banks is not forward-looking. 
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Table 6.8: Allowance and economic indicators 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ALL ALL ALL ALL 
          
LAG1_GLCO 0.114*** 0.116*** 0.118*** 0.118*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
BHC 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BHC_LGLCO 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
NAL 0.139*** 0.138*** 0.137*** 0.137*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
INLOAN 0.003*** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
COMLOAN 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SIZE -
0.000*** 
-
0.000*** 
-
0.000*** 
-
0.000***  ( .000) ( .000) ( .000) ( .000) 
CSRET -0.000*    
 (0.000)    
DUNRATE -
0.011*** 
   
 ( .002)    
DCOIN  0.001***   
  (0.000)   
LEAD_3M   0.001  
   (0.001)  
LEAD_12M    0.000 
    (0.002) 
Constant 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Observations 66,145 66,145 66,145 66,145 
R-squared 0.311 0.310 0.310 0.310 
Number of banks 7,962 7,962 7,962 7,962 
R2 within 0.311 0.310 0.310 0.310 
R2 overall 0.355 0.357 0.358 0.358 
R2 between 0.438 0.442 0.444 0.444 
F-stat 390.7 436.9 438.2 441.7 
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 
LAG1_GLCO: First lag of gross loan charge-offs on loans and leases; BHC: Dummy variable 
equals to 1 if the community bank is part of bank holding company; BHC_LGLCO: The 
interaction between variable BHC and lagged GLCO; NAL: Nonaccrual loans, leases and other 
assets; INLOAN: Loans to individuals for household, family, and other personal expenditures 
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scaled by lagged total assets; COMLOAN: Commercial and industrial loans scaled by lagged 
total assets; SIZE: Logged lagged total assets in thousands of dollars; CSRET: The yearly return 
on Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index from Federal Reserve Economic Data; 
DUNRATE: The yearly change in the unemployment rate from Bureau of Labor Statistics; 
DCOIN: The yearly change in the state coincident index from Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia scaled by 100; LEAD_3M: Last three months average at the end of a year of the 
state leading index from Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia scaled by 100; LEAD_12M: Last 
twelve months average at the end of a year of the state leading index from Federal Reserve Bank 
of Philadelphia scaled by 100. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study examines income-smoothing behavior in community banks, a topic barely covered in 
banking earning management literature. Specifically, we examine whether community banks 
smooth their income through loan loss provisioning. 
We follow the multidimensional approach proposed by FDIC community banking study 
(2012) to construct our community banks data set. This new approach enables us to cover large 
commercial banks and bank holding companies which are excluded in previous community 
banking studies. In addition, community banks under the new approach are more responsive to 
local events, which enables us to see the relationship between local economic conditions and loan 
loss provisions. Our sample includes 8485 individual community banks and 74630 bank-year 
observations.  
Overall, we find strong evidence that income smoothing does exist in community banks. 
While the motivations for income smoothing in community banks might be different from those 
of large commercial banks, we find how community banks overwhelmingly use loan loss 
provisioning to smooth their income. While our dataset does not allow us to directly test the 
community banks’ motivations for smoothing income, perhaps a) executive compensation is a 
motivation for their income smoothing as managers may be compensated for steady stream of 
earnings and b) urge to lower cost of external financing as raising external fund is as important in 
community banks as it is in large commercial banks. However, we do not find evidence supports 
the argument that diversified business of bank holding companies leads to a less aggressive income 
smoothing. We discover that stricter scrutiny from regulatory bodies, analysts, and investors has 
strong effect in income smoothing of community banks. Furthermore, we find that state-level local 
economic indicators significantly explain variation in loan loss provisioning of community banks. 
This result reinforces the argument that the local economic variations affect performance of 
community banks. Finally, we test the dynamic income smoothing proposed by Liu and Ryan 
(2006), and we find evidence that dynamic income smoothing exists in community banks. That is 
to say, banks accelerate loan charge-offs and recover them the next year and record more loan 
charge-offs when they have more loan recoveries at the same year in order to keep the allowance 
flat. 
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            Our findings have implications for regulators when they intend to make new policies on 
community banks due to their unique and important role in the local economy. 
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